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Abstract: GNSS-based applications are susceptible to different threats, including radio frequency
interference. Ensuring that the new applications can be validated against the latest threats supports
the wider adoption and success of GNSS in higher value markets. Therefore, the availability of
standardized GNSS receiver testing procedures is central to developing the next generation of
receiver technologies. The EU Horizon2020 research project STRIKE3 (Standardization of GNSS
Threat reporting and Receiver testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation
and Exploitation) proposed standardized test procedures to validate different categories of receivers
against real-world interferences, detected at different monitoring sites. This paper describes the
recorded interference signatures, their use in standardized test procedures, and analyzes the result
for two categories of receivers, namely mass-market and professional grade. The result analysis
in terms of well-defined receiver key performance indicators showed that performance of both
receiver categories was degraded by the selected interference threats, although there was considerable
difference in degree and nature of their impact.
Keywords: Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS); radio frequency interference; receiver
test standard
1. Introduction
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) technology plays an important role in an
ever-expanding range of safety, security, business, and policy critical applications. Moreover, many
critical infrastructures, such as telecommunication networks, energy grids, stock markets, etc. rely, at
least to some degree, on uninterrupted access to GNSS positioning, navigation, and timing services [1].
At the same time however, different threats have emerged which have the potential to degrade, disrupt,
or completely deny these GNSS services without prior warning [2]. This paper focusses on the threat
posed by Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) to the GNSS L1/E1 spectrum. RFI can be emitted either
unintentionally, e.g., by commercial high-power transmitters, ultra-wideband radar, television, VHF,
mobile satellite services, and personal electronic devices, or intentionally, e.g., by jammers and more
sophisticated signal spoofing devices [2,3].
Due to the proliferation of GNSS-based applications to almost every part of the globe it can be
assumed that this phenomenon of RFI threat to GNSS is no longer seen as a local or regional problem,
but rather requires an international perspective. To ensure GNSS is protected, there is now a need to
also respond at an international level by ensuring that there is the following: (i) A common standard
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for real-world GNSS threat monitoring and reporting, and (ii) a global standard for assessing the
performance of GNSS receivers and applications under threat.
GNSS threat reporting standards would allow for compilation of real-world threats into a database
that could be analyzed to develop GNSS receiver testing standards that ensure new applications are
validated against the latest threats [4–7]. Both these standards are currently missing across all civil
application domains and, if implemented, could potentially open the field for wider adoption and
success of GNSS in the higher value markets.
The EU Horizon2020 research project STRIKE3 (Standardization of GNSS Threat reporting and
Receiver testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation) is
a European initiative that addresses the need to monitor, detect, and characterize GNSS threats and
to propose standardized testing procedures to validate different categories of receivers against these
threats [4–7]. Importantly, STRIKE3 has deployed an international network of GNSS interference
monitoring sites that monitor interference on a global scale and capture real-world threats for further
analysis [8].
Utilizing thousands of threats collected from this network over a three-year period, STRIKE3 has
developed a baseline set of typical real-world interference/jamming threats that can be used to assess
performance of different categories of GNSS receivers. This baseline set, which is used in this paper
to assess the performance of two categories of receivers, consists of five different threat signatures as
follows: Wide swept frequency with fast repeat rate, multiple narrow band signals, triangular and
triangular wave swept frequency, and tick swept frequency. Additional details about the behavior of
these five threat signatures in the time and frequency domain and the criteria for their selection can be
found in [9]. The STRIKE3 project also proposed standardized testing procedures for GNSS receivers,
which make use of these threat signatures for receiver validation. Collectively, the above activities aim
to improve mitigation and resilience of future GNSS receivers against real-world interference threats.
An example of such an attempt has already been made in [3], where an adaptive interference mitigation
technique was proposed to counteract unintentional Narrow-Band Interference (NBI) detected at one
of the STRIKE3 monitoring sites.
In [10], European Telecommunications Standards Institute’s (ETSI) Satellite Communication and
Navigation (SCN) group of the Technical Committee Satellite Earth Stations and Systems (TC SES)
suggested to elaborate a firm and common standard for GNSS-based location systems. The group
addresses interference from the perspective of robustness to interference, interference localization,
and GNSS denial survival in addition to formulating location systems’ minimum performance
requirements. In particular, [11] discusses the GNSS based applications and standardization needs
more inclusively. In addition, the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation urges for development
of standards for interference-resistant receivers to include ARAIM (Advanced Receiver Autonomous
Integrity Monitoring) and RAIM to protect, toughen, and augment GNSS [12]. The international
aviation community has also been considering updating standards regarding GNSS aviation receivers,
improving their ability to withstand interference from repeaters, pseudolites, and jammers [13].
In order to address the need from various GNSS stakeholders, the STRIKE3 consortium proposed
a draft standard for GNSS receiver testing against real-world interferences detected at different
STRIKE3 monitoring sites, along with a test campaign following the guidelines from the drafted
receiver test standard. This paper discusses how the receiver testing is done and presents some of
the results obtained within STRIKE3 testing activity. In particular, the paper addresses mass market
and professional grade receiver testing. The test platform and the test methodology are described
in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4 provides an overview of the receiver configuration and
the simulated GNSS scenario settings, whereas Section 5 presents the five threats chosen for the tests.
Results of the tests carried out are presented and analyzed in Section 6 and, finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section 7.
Sensors 2019, 19, 1276 3 of 19
2. Test Platform
This Section describes the physical platform used to test mass-market and professional grade
GNSS receivers. For both categories, the test approach is the following:
1. The first iteration of the testing is performed using a clean GNSS signal without the presence of
any interference threats. This helps establish the baseline performance of the Receiver Under
Test (RUT).
2. Each subsequent test case addresses one threat scenario (one type of interference signal). Thus,
the performance of the receiver is recorded sequentially against the different interference signals.
3. Analysis of the recorded results is carried out to show the receiver behavior under conditions of
the different interference signals in terms of pre-defined performance metrics. This performance
is compared to the baseline under nominal signal conditions.
The test set-up, which is shown in Figure 1, includes the following equipment:
1. Spectracom GSG-6 RF GNSS constellation simulator [14],
2. Keysight Vector Signal Generator N5172B [15],
3. RUT, and
4. Laptop for data storage and analysis.
In addition, generic components such as coaxial cables and signal combiners are used. The clean
GNSS signal is generated from a multi-constellation, multi-frequency Spectracom GSG-6 hardware
simulator, whereas the threat signature is generated using Keysight’s Vector Signal Generator
(VSG) [15] through the replay of raw I/Q (In-phase/Quad-phase) sample data. The raw I/Q data
are captured in the field from the STRIKE3 monitoring sites and are used as input to the VSG, which
then re-creates the detected threat by continuously replaying the data in a loop. Both the GNSS
signal simulator and the VSG are controlled via software in order to automate the testing process.
The automation script is used to control these devices remotely and to limit human intervention.
The script also provides synchronization between the two instruments in order to ensure repeatability
of the tests and reliability of the results. A laptop is used to record and analyze the performance of the
receiver against the different threat signals. The analysis is performed using a MATLAB-based script
that processes the NMEA output messages from the RUT.
3. Receiver Test Methodology
Three different test methodologies are performed for each receiver category. A brief overview of
each test methodology is presented as follows.
3.1. Baseline Test Method
A clean GNSS signal, in the absence of interference, is fed to the RUT to validate its performance
under nominal condition. The total duration of this test is 60 min.
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In order to assess the performance of the RUT in the presence of interference, different metrics are
observed. The following outputs from the GNSS receiver are recorded and analyzed for all the test
methodologies:
1. Number of tracked satellites;
2. Position fix indicator;
3. Number of satellites used in fix;
4. Carrier-to-Noise density (C/N0) ratio;
5. East-North-Up deviations of the receiver’s solution from the true position.
Moreover, depending on the test methodology, additional parameters are evaluated. In the case
of TTRP t st method, the time aken for the RUT to re-obtain position fix aft r a strong interferenc
event is m asur d. Other metrics are of int rest in the case of the sensitivity test meth d. In particular,
the Jam ing-to-Signal ratio at which position solution is no longer available and the avail bility of
t positio solution du ing the interference event are computed in the sensitivity tests. Furthermore,
t maximum horizontal and vertical position errors are computed for the nterval in w ich th
interference is present when the receiver ffers a valid position fix.
4. Receiver Configuration and Simulated Scenario Settings
For the sake of simplicity, the GNSS receiver configuration (as defined in terms of the constellation
and frequency bands to be used in the validation) is restricted to GPS L1 single frequency (GPS SF) and
Galileo E1 single frequency (GALILEO SF). The RUT was first configured in factory settings mode and
then all the necessary modifications, based on the requirements of eac individual test case scenario,
were applied. It ust be noted, however, that the test procedure and set-up is also equally applicable
to other receiver configurati ns.
Since the RUT com ensat s f r the atmospheric effects, atmospheric modelling capability is
required in the testing activity. The GNSS si ulator supports a number of models to simul te such
effects and, in th tests, Klobuchar and aastamoinen models were us d for the ionosphere nd the
troposphere, respectively. The receiver w s configured in static stand-alone mode. Table 1 provides
an overvi w of th simulated sc nario settings, including also the start time, the duration, the GNSS
signal power, and the interf rence power levels for the different t st methodologies.
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Table 1. Simulated scenario settings.
Constellation GPS + Galileo
Number of satellites 10 (GPS) + 10 (Galileo)
Centre frequency (MHz) 1575.42
Ionosphere model Klobuchar (default parameters)
Troposphere model Saastamoinen (default parameters)
Start time 01.02.2018-12:00:00
Duration (min) 30 (TTRP) / 60 (sensitivity test and baseline)
GNSS signal power (dBm) −125
Interference power level for
‘TTRP test method’ (dBm)
−35
Interference power range for
‘Sensitivity test method’ (dBm) [−120: 5: −60]
J/S range for ‘Sensitivity test method’ (dB) [5: 5: 65]
Receiver location (Lat/Long/Alt) 60◦N/24◦E/30 m
When performing the tests, an elevation mask and a C/N0 mask are applied for the receiver’s
PVT computation. Satellites with elevations lower than 5◦ as well as satellites whose C/N0 are lower
than 25 dB-Hz are excluded from position computation, as reported in Table 2. At the beginning of
every test, the RUT is in cold start mode.
Table 2. Receiver configuration.
C/N0 threshold for satellite in Navigation Computation (dB-Hz) 25
Minimum elevation angle 5◦
Start mode Cold start
Dynamic model Stationary
5. Real-World Interference Classification
The purpose of the proposed test standards is not to propose a fixed set of threats to cover all
types of signal, but instead to develop draft standards for testing receivers against interference that
has been observed in the real world through the dedicated interference monitoring network. Using
real interference threats that have been detected in the field allows interested parties (e.g., certification
bodies, application developers, receiver manufacturers, etc.) to better assess the risk to GNSS
performance during operations and to develop appropriate counter-measures. However, with many
thousands of potential threats being detected by the monitoring network, it is impractical to test
receivers against all detected threats. Therefore, an initial selection process has been done and a
baseline set of 5 types of threats has been selected for inclusion in the draft test standard for receiver
testing [9].
In particular, each receiver is tested against the following 5 types of interference threats, described
in Table 3: Wide swept frequency with fast repeat rate, multiple narrow band signals, triangular and
triangular wave swept frequency, and tick swept frequency. Each of these threats is generated by the
VSG replaying raw I/Q data captured in the field during a real event, if not mentioned otherwise.
In Table 3, each type of threat is explained via an example plot with two figures. The left figure denotes
the estimated power spectral density at the GNSS L1/E1 carrier frequency ±8 MHz and the right
figure represents the spectrogram of the perceived interference. As can be seen in the example plots,
the spectrogram color map is defined so that the ‘blue’ color represents the least signal power, whereas
the ‘red’ color represents the most signal power.
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Table 3. Description of baseline set of selected threats.
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6. Test Results  
This section presents the results of the standardized tests for the two categories of receivers, 
Mass-Market (MM) and PROfessional (PRO) RUT. An initial version of the test results was published 
in [16], where the results were analyzed only for one interference signature. The published article in 
[16] only offered a general overview on the impact on the receivers when exposed to real-world 
interference and it lacked a thorough analysis of receivers’ performance under different 
circumstances (e.g., impact of C/N0 thresholding, impact of how the interference signal is generated, 
impact of various interference signatures, impact on dual frequency receiver, etc.). Therefore, an 
extensive result analysis of receiver testing is presented as follows.  
For each RUT category, a summary table provides a comparison between the impacts of the 5 
selected types of interference. In particular, the results are shown in terms of the following metrics: 
1. Maximum horizontal position error during the interference interval; 
2. Maximum vertical position error during the interference interval; 
3. Position fix availability during the interference interval; 
4. Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is lost for at least 5 s (J/SPVT_lost); 
5. Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is reobtained for at least 5 s (J/SPVT_reobtained); 
6. TTRP. 
The receiver’s performance under conditions of the different interference signals is compared to 
the baseline under nominal signal conditions. For the baseline case, the statistics are computed by 
considering the interval corresponding to the one when, in the interference test case, the interference 
would be on. This ensures that the differences in the test statistics of the receiver performance, 
between a baseline test case and the selected threat test case, is solely due to the impact of the threat 
signature on the GNSS signal.  
6.1. Mass Market Receiver 
The performance of the MM RUT is summarized in Table 4. Whenever an interfering signal is 
present, as its power increases, the receiver performance degrades until, at some point, the position 
fix is lost. The receiver is then capable to re-compute a position solution only when the interference 
power decreases. An example of such interference impact on the mass-market RUT performance is 
given in Figures 4 and 5, which show, respectively, the average C/N0 of tracked satellites and the 
East-North-Up deviations of the position solution for the test case MM02-STATIC-SENSITIVITY 
(threat signature 02: multiple narrowband interfering signals). In both figures, the corresponding 
two-peak ramp interference power profile could also be seen (in the right-hand Y-axis) for the 
sensitivity test methodology, as described in Section 3.3. 
The inaccurate position solution, especially in the vertical component computed by the RUT at 
the beginning of the test, is due to the cold start and the resulting unavailability of ionospheric 
parameters and to the convergence of the navigation filter. 
As it can be seen from Table 4, the Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is lost for at 
least 5 s (J/SPVT_lost) and the Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is reobtained for at least 
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For each RUT category, a summary table provides a comparison between the impacts of the 5
selected types of interference. In particular, the results are shown in terms of the following metrics:
1. Maximum horizontal position error during the interference interval;
2. Maximum vertical position error during the interference interval;
3. Position fix availability during the interference interval;
4. Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is lost for at least 5 s (J/SPVT_lost);
5. Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is reobtained for at least 5 s (J/SPVT_reobtained);
6. TTRP.
The receiver’s performance under conditions of the different interference signals is compared to
the baseline under nominal signal conditions. For the baseline case, the statistics are computed by
considering the interval corresponding to the one when, in the interference test case, the interference
would be on. This ensures that the differences in the test statistics of the receiver performance, between
a baseline test case and the selected threat test case, is solely due to the impact of the threat signature
on the GNSS signal.
6.1. Mass Market Receiver
The performance of the MM RUT is summarized in Table 4. Whenever an interfering signal is
present, as its power increases, the receiver performance degrades until, at some point, the position
fix is lost. The receiver is then capable to re-compute a position solution only when the interference
power decreases. An example of such interference impact on the mass-market RUT performance is
given in Figures 4 and 5, which show, respectively, the average C/N0 of tracked satellites and the
East-North-Up deviations of the position solution for the test case MM02-STATIC-SENSITIVITY (threat
signature 02: multiple narrowband interfering signals). In both figures, the corresponding two-peak
ramp interference power profile could also be seen (in the right-hand Y-axis) for the sensitivity test
methodology, as described in Section 3.3.
The inaccurate position solution, especially in the vertical component computed by the RUT at the
beginning of the test, is due to the cold start and the resulting unavailability of ionospheric parameters
and to the convergence of the navigation filter.
As it can be seen from Table 4, the Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is lost for
at least 5 s (J/SPVT_lost) and the Jamming-to-Signal ratio at which the position fix is reobtained for at
least 5 s (J/SPVT_reobtained) are in the range 45–50 dB and 30–45 dB, respectively. This translates into
a position fix availability in the presence of the five interference threats between ~60% and ~70%.
The triangular swept frequency interference signature (i.e., test case MM03) seems to be the most
impactful, both in terms of availability and maximum position error.












(dB) TTRP * (s)
Baseline 0.74 1.7 100% - - -
MM01 6.14 8.3 65.07% 50 35 4
MM02 5.11 4.5 67.96% 50 45 1
MM03 40.30 32.28 60.44% 45 35 1
MM04 5.68 3.7 61.47% 50 30 1
MM05 3.9 3.1 70.27% 50 45 1
* TTRP values are otained with TTRP test cases and the other matrices (e.g., maximum horizontal position error,
maximum vertical position error, etc.) are obtained either in the baseline test case or in different sensitivity test
cases, as represented by the test id.
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The TTRP tests sh wed that the mass-market RUT is capable of recovering from a strong
interference event almost immediately. The TTRP value is, in fact, 1 s for four of the tested interference
signatures, and 4 s in the case of a wide swept frequency signal with a fast repeat rate (i.e., test
case MM01).
6.2. Professional Grade Receiver
Similar to the MM receiver, the consequences of the interference presence on the PRO grade RUT
are degradation in the signal quality and hence the position accuracy, which worsen as the interference
level increases, until the RUT loses its position fix. An example of such interference impact on the
PRO grade RUT is given in Figures 6 and 7, which show the average C/N0 of tracked satellites and
the East-North-Up deviations of the position solution for the test case PRO02-STATIC-SENSITIVITY
(threat signature 02: multiple narrowband interfering signals), respectively.
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Additionally, in this case, due to the cold start and the resulting unavailability of ionospheric 
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Additionally, in this case, due to the cold start and the resulting unavailability of ionospheric
parameters and to the convergence of the navigation filter, the professional grade RUT offers an
inaccurate positio solution in the beginning, especially in the vertical component.
Table 5 summarizes the r sults for the PRO grade RUT. It can be see that both J/SPVT_lo t d
J/SPVT_reobtained are in the rang 40–55 dB and 35–45 dB, respectively. Consequently, the position fix
availability for the professional grade RUT in the presence of the five int rference threats is between
~61% and ~66%. The TTRP tests showed that the professional grade RUT takes from 6 to 10 s to recover
from a strong interfer nce event.
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(dB) TTRP * (s)
Baseline 0.28 0.41 100% - - -
PRO01 3.76 1.89 66.36% 55 35 9
PRO02 0.66 1.88 66.09% 55 35 10
PRO03 0.97 2.19 66.04% 45 35 10
PRO04 0.78 0.97 63.16% 40 45 6
PRO05 2.63 1.55 61.29% 40 40 6
* TTRP values are otained with TTRP test cases and the other matrices (e.g., maximum horizontal position error,
maximum vertical position error, etc.) are obtained either in baseline test case or in different sensitivity test cases, as
represented by the test id.
6.3. Comparison Between Mass Market and Professional Grade RUT with Default C/N0 Masking Settings
From the comparison between Tables 4 and 5, it can be observed that the availability of the position
fix during the interference interval does not differ much between mass market and professional grade
receivers. This is partly due to the fact that the C/N0 mask was set to 25 dB-Hz for both the receivers’
PVT computation. In order to properly compare the behavior of the two categories of RUT, additional
tests with default C/N0 mask settings were carried out. In particular, sensitivity tests were performed
for the mass market and the professional receiver in the presence of the threat signature 03, triangular
chirp swept frequency interference signal (MM03 and PRO03).
Figure 8 shows the ENU (East-North-Up) deviations of the position solution for the MM and
the PRO receivers. As it can be seen from the figure, the behaviour of the two receiver categories
differs significantly when default settings of C/N0 are used. In particular, the MM RUT prioritizes
the availability of the position solution over its accuracy. During the interference interval, there are
only a few epochs at which the receiver does not yield a position solution, but this high yield comes
with degraded positioning accuracy. On the other hand, the PRO RUT prioritizes the accuracy over
the availability. It does not offer the position solution as often during the interference interval, but
when it does the position errors are small.
The difference between the mass market and the professional grade receivers’ behavior is also
visible in Figure 9, which shows the drop in the average C/N0 of the satellites used in position fix with
respect to the baseline for the entire duration of the test. While the MM RUT continues to use very low
quality signals in order to provide a position solution, even if inaccurate, for as long as possible, the
PRO RUT stops computing the solution when the signal quality decreases by about 20 dB.
A summary of the results of the tests with default C/N0 settings is given in Table 6. The maximum
horizontal and vertical errors are computed for the interval in which the interference is present and
the receiver also offers a position fix. As already discussed, the position fix availability during
the interference interval for the mass-market receiver is high (97.91%) at the expense of position
accuracy. On the other hand, the professional grade RUT preserves the position accuracy at the
expense of solution availability (58.58%). The maximum horizontal and vertical errors in the test case
are only slightly larger than in the baseline case. It is important to recall here that the availability is
computed only for the duration when interference is active. It can be observed from Table 6 that, when
manufacturer’s default receiver settings are used, the mass market RUT has much higher sensitivity
as compared to the professional grade RUT. The former is able to withstand the interference event
through the entire rising ramp of the interference power profile and for most of the falling ramp
duration. The position fix is lost after the interference power peak has been reached (precisely, at
J/S = 30 dB) and it is regained after a few seconds. The behavior is different for the PRO RUT which
instead stops offering a position solution as soon as the interference reaches a power level such that
J/S is 45 dB.
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A summary of the results of the tests with default C/N0 settings is given in Table 6. The maximum 
horizontal and vertical errors are computed for the interval in which the interference is present and 
the receiver also offers a position fix. As already discussed, the position fix availability during the 
interference interval for the mass-market receiver is high (97.91%) at the expense of position accuracy. 
On the other hand, the professional grade RUT preserves the position accuracy at the expense of 
solution availability (58.58%). The maximum horizontal and vertical errors in the test case are only 
slightly larger than in the baseline case. It is important to recall here that the availability is computed 
only for the duration when interference is active. It can be observed from Table 6 that, when 
manufacturer’s default receiver settings are used, the mass market RUT has much higher sensitivity 
as compared to the professional grade RUT. The former is able to withstand the interference event 
through the entire rising ramp of the interference power profile and for most of the falling ramp 
duration. The position fix is lost after the interference power peak has been reached (precisely, at J/S 
= 30 dB) and it is regained after a few seconds. The behavior is different for the PRO RUT which 
i r . ast- orth-Up deviations for (a) T a ( ) i t r s c f t r t
i t r N0 default settings are used in both the receivers.
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6.4. Synthetic vs. Real-World Signature Impact Analysis
The results presented in the previous sections were obtained by generating the interference
through the replay of raw I/Q sample data captured in the field by the STRIKE3 monitoring sites.
In addition, a set of tests was also conducted using a second approach for the threat generation;
creating synthetic I/Q data with properties that are representative of the real signals and replaying
them with the VSG. The advantage is that the generated signal is free of multipath and GNSS PRN
codes, hence it is cleaner than the one recorded in the field. However, this approach has limitations
when the original signal is complex and difficult to re-create synthetically, such as in the case of chirp
tick signal, as the resultant interference signal may not accurately reflect the real one and, therefore,
the impact on the receiver performance may be different.
Sensitivity testing with synthetic interference signals was performed only for the MM RUT.
In particular, the following four, out of the five threat signatures described in Table 3, were possible
to be re-created via VSG: Wide swept frequency with fast repeat rate, multiple narrow band signals,
triangular, and triangular wave swept frequency. The results are summarized in Table 7, which also
includes the results obtained with live interference data recorded in the field. For each performance
metric, the column with label “S” contains the results for synthetic signature, whereas the column with
label “R” contains the results for recorded signature.










S R S R S R S R S R
MM01 0.44 6.14 1.3 8.3 43.16% 65.07% 45 50 10 35
MM02 3.12 5.11 3.2 4.5 50.98% 67.96% 50 50 25 45
MM03 0.81 40.3 2 32.28 41.47% 60.44% 50 45 10 35
MM04 1 5.68 2.1 3.7 39.91% 61.47% 55 50 0 30
As it can be observed from Table 7, the synthetic signatures have a stronger impact on the RUT.
This is shown by the reduced availability of the position fix due to the longer time needed by the
receiver to recover from the interfering event. J/SPVT_reobtained takes values in the range of 30–45 dB
when recorded interference is used, while it is in the range of 0–25 dB in the case of synthetic threat
signatures. In one test case (i.e., triangular wave swept frequency signal, MM04), the RUT is capable
of reobtaining the PVT solution only after the interference has been turned off. As an example, the
difference in the impact to the receiver between the recorded and synthetic signature can be seen in
Figure 10, which shows the East-North-Up deviations of the receiver’s solution from the true position
in the test case MM04, using recorded interference and synthetic interference.
It is observed that the number of epochs in which the RUT is not capable of providing a position
fix is significantly higher when synthetic interference is used. This could be due to the fact that the
synthetic signatures are free of multipath and GNSS PRN codes and hence are much cleaner than the
recorded ones. This is indeed an empirical conclusion from the perceived tests, which would require
further investigation in this direction. It would always remain a challenge to reproduce a real-world
detected interference event, since the reproduction of the signal will always be based on the digitized
raw In-phase Quad-phase (IQ) samples in the presence of a real GNSS signal. On the other hand, the
reproduction of a synthetically generated signal does not have any GNSS signature in it, as the samples
are taken from the real jamming device and then reproduced via VSG.
Sensors 2019, 19, 1276 15 of 19
Sensors 2019, 19, x FOR PEER REVIEW 16 of 20 
 
MM03 0.81 40.3 2 32.28 41.47% 60.44% 50 45 10 35 
MM04 1 5.68 2.1 3.7 39.91% 61.47% 55 50 0 30 
As it can be observed from Table 7, the synthetic signatures have a stronger impact on the RUT. 
This is shown by the reduced availability of the position fix due to the longer time needed by the 
receiver to recover from the interfering event. J/SPVT_reobtained takes values in the range of 30–45 dB when 
recorded interference is used, while it is in the range of 0–25 dB in the case of synthetic threat 
signatures. In one test case (i.e., triangular wave swept frequency signal, MM04), the RUT is capable 
of reobtaining the PVT solution only after the interference has been turned off. As an example, the 
difference in the impact to the receiver between the recorded and synthetic signature can be seen in 
Figure 10, which shows the East-North-Up deviations of the receiver’s solution from the true position 





Figure 10. East-North-Up deviations for test case MM04-STATIC-SENSITIVITY using (a) recorded 
interference and (b) synthetic interference. 
Figure 10. East- orth- deviatio s for test case 04-STATIC-SENSITIVITY using (a) recorded
interference and (b) synthetic interference.
6.5. Dual Frequency Receiver Testing
Dual-frequency tests, where the RUT is configured to receive GPS/Galileo signals, in both L1/E1
and L5/E5 frequency bands, were also performed. In particular, a dual-frequency professional grade
receiver was assessed in the presence of the wide swept frequency with fast repeat rate interfering
signal (i.e., PRO01). The interference was generated only at the L1/E1 carrier frequency. The objective
of such test was to investigate if the RUT could intelligently exploit the frequency diversity in the
presence of interference in one of the frequency bands.
Since no information on the L5/E5 signals could be retrieved from the NMEA files, the analysis
was conducted using a MATLAB-based script that processes the RINEX files from the RUT. For each
of the five signals (GPS L1, GPS L5, Galileo E1, Galileo E5b, and Galileo E5a), the number of tracked
satellites and the signal strength from the tracked satellites for each signal were analyzed. The impact
of the interference on L1/E1 band is clearly visible in Figures 11a and 12a, which show the C/N0
values for the GPS L1 C/A and the Galileo E1b signals, respectively. As expected, as the interference
power increases, the C/N0 ratio of the signals in the L1/E1 band decreases until, at some point, the
RUT stops tracking them and it is no longer offering the corresponding observations. It is interesting
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to find out that the signals in the L5/E5 band are also affected, even though the frequencies are far
apart from the interfering band (i.e., Figures 11b and 12b).
However, it can also be observed that the receiver does not generate L5/E5 observations for those
epochs in which no L1/E1 observation is generated. It can be seen from both Figures 11 and 12 that the
data gaps in the test case for both the frequencies were identical. No observation is generated for GPS
L5 satellites as soon as the L1 signals are so degraded that the RUT cannot track them, even though the
L5 signal quality is still good. The same happens with Galileo. This shows that the RUT was not yet
able to exploit the frequency diversity to withstand the interference.
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7. Conclusions
The results of the standardized tests for the two categories of receivers were presented. The results
were analyzed in terms of well-defined receiver key performance indicators. The result analysis
showed that both the receiver categories were impacted ominously by the interference threats. More
specifically, it was observed that the mass-market RUT was capable of recovering from a high-powered
jamming event much faster than the professional grade RUT. Moreover, the MM RUT was capable
of withstanding a power-varying interference event longer than the PRO RUT, resulting in a much
higher availability for MM RUT than that of a PRO RUT. On the contrary, in terms of performance
accuracy, PRO RUT is instead performing better than the MM RUT. However, when a C/N0 mask
of 25 dB-Hz was applied at the PVT computation stage for both the receiver categories, they tend to
behave almost similarly against interference threats, i.e., both the receivers exhibit similar availability
against the same kind of interference threat.
A performance comparison of the RUT under different threat signatures, considering the
methodology the interfering signal is generated (i.e., via synthetic signal or via real recorded signal),
was also presented. The objective of this test set up was to investigate the impact of the interference
signal generation on the RUT’s positioning performance. The results showed that the interfering
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signals generated synthetically had impacted the RUT more than the real-recorded version of the
same signatures. This could potentially be due to the fact that the synthetic signatures are free from
multipath and GNSS PRN codes and, hence, are much cleaner than the recorded ones, resulting in a
far-reaching impact on the RUT’s navigation performance.
Dual frequency GPS/Galileo L1/E1 and L5/E5 test was also carried out in order to investigate if
the RUT could intelligently exploit the frequency diversity in the presence of interference in the L1/E1
frequency band. It was interesting to experience that the L5/E5 signals were also affected to a lesser
extent, even though the interference was on L1/E1 band. It was noticed that the professional RUT
did not generate L5/E5 observations for those epochs in which no L1/E1 observation was generated.
Based on this result, it can be stated that the RUT was not yet capable of exploiting the frequency
diversity to withstand the interference in L1/E1 band.
Overall, this paper shows that the availability of threat signatures and standardized test
procedures is critical towards understanding the behavior of GNSS receivers under the most frequently
encountered interference threats. This, in turn, should help the GNSS community in developing the
next generation of robust receiver technologies and to support wider utilization of GNSS in safety and
liability-critical high-value applications.
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